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The Minimum Wage, Bargaining Power, and the Top Income Share 
By Liam C. Malloy 
Abstract 
Much of the argument in support of the minimum wage is its ability to lift workers out of 
poverty. But the minimum wage also has the potential to influence the relative bargaining 
power between (non-union) workers and firms and historically this was one of its main 
purposes. In this paper we review how the minimum wage can improve workers’ bargaining 
position. We use a state-level panel data set that exploits differences in the minimum wage at 
the state level to show that higher minimum wages, along with unionization rates and higher 
top marginal tax rates, are successful in reducing overall income inequality, mainly by 
reducing the share of income going to the top 1 percent of the income distribution. 
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I. Introduction 
The federal minimum wage was first enacted as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) in 1938 and has been increased incrementally since then. The real federal minimum 
wage hit a high in 1968 at almost $11 compared to $7.25 today (both in 2015 dollars). However, 
many states since the late 1960s have raised their minimum wage above the federal minimum. 
Much of the argument for raising the minimum wage focuses on paying minimum wage workers 
a living wage and lifting working Americans out of poverty (Card and Krueger 1995, Addison 
and Blackburn 1999, Morgan and Kickham 2001, etc. Dube 2013 provides a review). Arguments 
against raising the minimum wage generally focus on the potentially negative employment 
effects for low-wage workers (see, for example, Neumark, Salas, and Wascher 2013 and 2014). 
But one of the main effects of the minimum wage was to increase the bargaining power 
of workers at non-union firms. Firms with significant monopsony power in the labor market may 
be able to pay workers significantly less than their marginal (or average) product of labor. This 
will increase profits and should lead to an increase in the income of executives and shareholders 
at the top of the income distribution. A minimum wage, along with other institutional labor rules, 
increases the bargaining power of workers, both those who are earning the minimum wage and 
those just above.  
This bargaining power between workers and executives (or firms) is unobservable but 
extremely important. While it includes the power of organized labor and collective bargaining, it 
is by no means limited to union strength and activities. When workers have more bargaining 
power firms must set higher initial wages, offer larger annual wage and salary increases, and 
provide better benefits and working conditions in order to keep their workers. When firms have 
more bargaining power they can demand longer hours for less pay, tell workers there is no 
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money for raises, and replace workers more easily. Because those workers at the bottom of the 
wage distribution are often those with the weakest bargaining power, an increase in the minimum 
wage can be extremely important for them by making it illegal for firms to push wages as low as 
they can. While a higher minimum wage may have the effect of increasing income at the bottom 
of the income distribution and lifting some people out of poverty, it may also reduce the share of 
income going to the top which is the focus of this paper. 
The debate about the effects of the minimum wage on employment are well known, but 
less well researched is the effect of an increase in the minimum wage on the income share of the 
top 1 percent or the top 0.1 percent. As Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) have shown, executives 
and managers make up about a third of the top 1 percent. Those in finance make up another 14 
percent and these two groups make up about 60 percent of the top 0.1 percent. These groups are 
likely to benefit when firms are able to increase profits by keeping labor costs low, either 
through higher executive pay or increased dividends. 
The variation in the minimum wage by state allows us to look at the effects of an increase 
in the real minimum wage on the top 1 percent income share. Currently the highest minimum 
wage is Washington D.C. $10.50 per hour followed by Massachusetts and California at $10 
while a number of states have no specific minimum wage and employers must meet only the 
federal minimum. Combined with data on the income distribution from Frank (2009 and 2014) 
as well as other variables that show the shifting bargaining power between labor and 
management (and shareholders), we are able to show that the most significant effect of an 
increase in the minimum wage is not a reduction in the poverty rate, but a reduction in the share 
of income going to the top 1 percent. We present evidence that increases in the minimum wage 
reduce the income share of the 1 percent. We provide an interpretation of this distributional 
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effect that supports our claim about the effectiveness of the FLSA and the state minimum wage 
increases. 
After a review of the literature on the importance of bargaining power on wages and the 
effects of the minimum wage in section II, section III presents fixed-effect and Arellano-Bond 
GMM regressions that look at the effect of the minimum wage on the Gini coefficient, the top 1 
percent and top 10 percent income share, the poverty rate, and the income levels for the 10th and 
20th percentile households. Section IV concludes and discusses potential policies to reduce 
income inequality. 
II. The minimum wage in a bargaining power setting 
In the homogenous world of perfect competition, information, and labor mobility there are no 
economic profits to be had. Workers are all the same and firms are all the same. If a firm will not 
pay a worker her marginal product of labor, the worker will go to another firm who will. 
Similarly, if a worker demands more than his marginal product of labor, the firm will hire 
someone else. There is no bargain to be struck between the worker and the firm in this case as 
the firm cannot afford to pay more than a worker’s marginal product or risk going out of 
business, and the worker will be unwilling to accept anything less than her marginal product or 
she will switch jobs. 
While the neoclassical model of wage determination is often used in modeling the labor 
market and thinking about movements of the average wage, it is not as useful when thinking 
about how the income distribution is determined. Recent macroeconomic modelers have returned 
to a view of the labor market in which wages are bargained over. Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1994) assume that each worker-firm match creates a surplus between the value created by the 
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job and the worker’s reservation wage (based on the value of unemployment benefits). In their 
model, how the surplus is split is exogenous. When they calibrate the model, they assume the 
Nash bargaining parameter (β) to be 0.5 so that the surplus is split evenly between the worker 
and firm. 
Piketty, Saez, and Stancheva (2014) believe that top marginal tax rates affect the relative 
bargaining position, through what they refer to as the bargaining elasticity, or e3 in their model, 
between workers and executives and show that top income shares shrink as the top marginal tax 
rate increases. Malloy (2015) takes this one step further and suggests that lower top marginal tax 
rates, falling unionization rates, and increasing imports all reduce the income growth of the 
bottom 90 percent of the income distribution, presumably by decreasing labor’s bargaining 
power. 
There is increasing work done both on the institutional side of economics and within 
sociology that labor’s declining bargaining power is one of the main explanations for increasing 
income inequality. Ellis and Smith (2007) and Bental and Demougin (2010) believe that the 
increased ability of the firm to monitor its workers has decreased the need for efficiency wages 
and thus reduced labor’s bargaining power. Kristal (2010 and 2013) focuses on the zero sum 
game of how the surplus is split between labor and capital and sees falling unionization, non-
defense government spending, “bargaining centralization”, and increased trade and 
computerization as decreasing workers’ bargaining power. 
As the bargaining power of labor has fallen, that of the top 1 percent has increased. 
Bivens and Mishel (2013) see the increased income of the top 1 percent as evidence of 
executives and financial professionals’ ability to better capture rents that may have been captured 
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more successfully by organized labor in the past. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) believe that 
deregulation in the product and labor markets is likely the cause of this shift in rent capture, but 
believe that it may equalize again in the long run. Choi and Rios-Rull (2009) show that even in a 
real business cycle model bargaining over wages can help explain a lower labor share as 
productivity increases. 
There is a more limited literature on the effects of the minimum wage on income 
inequality. Freeman (1996) looks at the potential positives and negatives of using the minimum 
wage as a redistributive tool while Flinn (2006) presents a theoretical model showing that a 
higher minimum wage can be welfare improving. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Lee 
(1999), and Autor, Manning, and Smith (2014) all look at the effects of the minimum wage on 
lower incomes, typically the ratio of the median income to the income at the 10th percentile. 
They all find that the minimum wage does decrease inequality by increasing wages at the 
bottom, usually around the 10th percentile, although Autor, Manning, and Smith, using an IV 
estimation technique, find a somewhat lesser effect than the earlier articles.  
Our technique is somewhat different in that we test for an effect at the top of the income 
distribution, something Lee (1999) and Autor, Manning, and Smith (2014) believe should not be 
present in the data and, indeed, something that may represent bias in the regression results, 
leading to their choice of statistical technique. Our view, however, is that an increase in the 
minimum wage represents an increase in the bargaining power of labor and is therefore likely to 
show up as a decrease in the share of income going to the top 1 percent, either as managers, 
executives, or shareholders. This calls into question the assumptions of these earlier papers, and 
we show a clear relationship between the minimum wage and the top 1 percent income share. 
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Once we move away from the assumption of perfect competition to a more realistic 
picture in which firms are able to earn positive economic profits, workers are heterogeneous and 
potentially immobile, and there is less than perfect information, there can be a wide range, or 
surplus, over which wages can be bargained. The minimum a worker will accept will be some 
type of reservation wage (wR), dependent on unemployment benefits, other employment options, 
and the value of leisure. The maximum wage a firm will pay a worker, wmax, may be above the 
worker’s marginal product of labor but will be limited by the firm’s need to have non-negative 
profits so as to stay in business (Schneider 2011 reviews the evidence of wages above and below 
a worker’s MPL). 
How the surplus between the reservation wage and the maximum wage is split depends on 
the relative bargaining power of the firm and worker. While union representation is one aspect of 
bargaining power, when we discuss bargaining power here, we do not just mean the process of 
collective bargaining. A worker’s bargaining power will increase based on education and skills 
(human capital), the availability of other employment opportunities (including how mobile the 
worker is), and the institutional setup of the labor market. This last category will include the tax 
structure, including everything from the top marginal tax rate to the existence of a negative 
income tax rate such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) at the bottom of the income 
distribution, and the existence and value of the minimum wage, both as a wage floor (Autor, 
Manning, and Smith 2014), and as an anchor in the minds of labor and firms (Falk et al. 2006). 
Theoretically, the minimum wage could either increase or decrease a worker’s bargaining 
power or have no effect. If the minimum wage isn’t binding, so that it is below the worker’s 
reservation wage (Figure 1a), there will be no effect on either wages or employment. Another 
possibility is that the maximum wage the firm can pay a worker and still stay in business is 
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below the minimum wage (Figure 1b). If this is the case for many workers, the existence of the 
minimum wage will have large and negative employment effects. Despite the wide ranging 
debate, the evidence seems to be on the side of only small employment effects from a higher 
minimum wage, mainly for teenagers and restaurant workers (Neumark, Salas, and Wascher 
2013 and 2014, Dube et al. 2010 and Allegretto et al. 2011).  
     [Figure 1 here] 
On the other hand, the minimum wage could be above the worker’s reservation wage, but 
below the maximum wage (Figure 1c). In this case the existence of a wage floor truncates the 
bargaining space and will increase the wage paid to at least some of the workers who fall in this 
category. In this case the minimum wage will be a binding price floor for at least some workers 
and we could expect to see a mass of workers earning the minimum which is precisely what we 
see in the data1. The fact that there is a non-negligible percentage of workers earning the 
minimum wage provides direct support for the wage bargaining view of the labor market as 
opposed to the neo-classical view (which would require a group of workers all coincidentally 
having MPL = wmin). 
Both the minimum wage and the EITC are designed to increase incomes and reduce 
poverty among those who are working. There is some evidence that the EITC is more effective at 
reducing poverty than is the minimum wage. Card and Kreuger (1995), followed recently by 
Burkhauser and Sabia (2007), find no effect of increases in the minimum wage on reducing 
poverty. They recommend an extension of the EITC as the most effective way of reducing the 
                                                 
1 According to the BLS (2014), 4.3 percent of workers earned the minimum wage or below. This was 
down significantly from a high of 13.4 percent in 1979, implying that the real minimum wage may be 
falling toward workers’ reservation wages. 
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poverty rate2. Dube (2013), however, reviews the mixed evidence and finds a significant effect 
of the minimum wage on reducing poverty in his own work.  
However, these two policies have very different effects on the relative bargaining power 
of low-wage workers. As already discussed, a minimum wage truncates the bargaining space and 
increases the wage both for those earning the minimum wage and those just above it (Autor et al 
2010) or below (Boeri et al 2010). The EITC, on the other hand, by providing a wage subsidy to 
low-wage workers paid for by taxpayers, reduces the (market) reservation wage for workers, and 
therefore is likely to reduce wages for some low-wage workers and reduce labor costs for firms. 
Perhaps it is not a surprise that it is the anti-poverty measure favored by many executives. 
The fact that the EITC is favored over the minimum wage by many executives and 
shareholders such as Warren Buffett (who is no inequality apologist) (Novack 2015) also 
supports the idea that these firm representatives recognize the importance of (unobservable) 
bargaining power for their own compensation. If the firm is able to increase its relative 
bargaining power and reduce labor costs, there will be more surplus available to pay out as 
executive compensation or dividends. In terms of the data, this view implies that as labor’s 
overall bargaining power declines, we would expect to see an increasing share of income going 
to the top 1 percent of the income distribution. The EITC may be a more successful method in 
reducing the poverty rate (as noted above), but it reduces labor’s bargaining power instead of 
increasing it. Dube (2013), however, argues that the EITC is a complement to the minimum 
wage in combating poverty. 
                                                 
2 Scholz (1994), Neumark and Wascher (2001), and Hoynes et al. (2006) all find that the EITC is 
effective in reducing the poverty rate. 
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Currently, the proposed increase of the minimum wage is supported by the AFL-CIO: 
“Raising the minimum wage is a critical and simple way to help repair the underlying weakness 
in our economy. It would boost consumer spending and increase the purchasing power of 
millions of low-wage workers, especially in states with the highest percentages of low-wage 
workers—many of which also have the highest rates of poverty.”3 
Of course, bargaining power is not something that’s observable in the data. Instead we 
have to look at the variables that we expect will change the relative bargaining power between 
workers and firms. These variables include union membership, international trade (if offshore 
production is being used as a substitute for domestic production), the tax structure (Malloy 
2015), and, the focus of this paper, the minimum wage. Our hypothesis is that an increase in the 
minimum wage will decrease the share of income going to the top 1 percent.  
This hypothesized relationship is summarized in Figure 2. Bargaining power between 
labor and firms is unobserved, but depends on unionization rates, top marginal tax rates, growth, 
and the minimum wage. The outcome of this is how the worker-firm surplus is split with the 
observed variable being the top 1 percent income share. 
[Figure 2 here] 
We test the hypothesis that an increase in the minimum wage will reduce the income 
share going to the top 1 percent below. Our view of the importance of bargaining power in the 
labor market allows us to formulate two hypotheses that will be tested in the next section: 
H1: An increase in the state minimum wage will decrease the level of state income inequality. 
                                                 
3 http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Jobs-and-Economy/Wages-and-Income/Minimum-Wage 
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We expect this mainly to happen through a pre-tax redistribution from those at the top of 
the income distribution to those who are working at low paying jobs. This brings us to our 
second hypothesis: 
H2: An increase in the state minimum wage will reduce the share of income going to the top 1 
percent in that state. 
We also test for the effect of the minimum wage on the income share going to the top 10 
percent, the poverty rate, and the income of those at the 10th and 20th income percentiles. But we 
have no strong prior views as to the expected effects. 
III. Effects of the Minimum Wage using State-Level Panel Data 
The minimum wage sets a floor for workers’ wages. Thus, even when the bargaining 
power of workers is very weak and that of their employers is strong, firms cannot pay less than 
the minimum wage. In the case in which the minimum wage is between most workers’ 
reservation wages and their marginal (or average) product of labor, we expect that a higher 
minimum wage will increase workers’ incomes and reduce incomes going to the top, either in the 
form of executive compensation or owner/shareholder profits/dividends. 
In order to measure the effects of the minimum wage, we construct a panel dataset of the 
50 states from 1979 to 2009. Our hypothesis is that the minimum wage represents one factor of 
the relative bargaining power between labor and management. Other factors we include are 
unionization levels, top marginal tax rates, and education levels of the work force. 
We use the state minimum wage rates for standard workers (as opposed to tipped workers 
or trainees), from the U.S. Department of Labor, and adjust nominal values using the consumer 
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price index for all items. Inequality and education measures come from Frank (2009 and 2014) 
and include the Gini coefficient and the top 1 percent and top 10 percent income share. 
Unionization levels by state come from Hirsch et al. 2001 (updated online) and include both 
private sector and public sector workers. Top marginal tax rates for each state come from 
Feenberg and Couts (1993, calculated from Taxsim and updated on NBER’s web site). 
Macroeconomic state variables come from the BEA and BLS. Summary statistics for the main 
variables of interest are presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
There is significant variation in all of the variables over the 31 years and 50 states. The 
minimum wage (in 2009 dollars) varies from a low of $5.33 to a high of $10.05. The Gini 
coefficient (expressed from 0 to 100) ranges from a low of 44.63 to 70.88 with an average of 
55.66. Relatedly, the top 1 percent income share has a low of 5.72 percent and a high of 28.24 
percent. On the other end of the income distribution, the poverty rate ranges from 2.9 percent to 
27.2 percent. Figure 3 provides a scatter plot of the real effective minimum wage in each state 
from 1979-2009 and the top 1 percent income share. There is a clear negative relationship in the 
data. 
[Figure 3 here] 
There are a number of possible econometric techniques to find the relationship between 
the minimum wage and our variables of interest. We start out with standard fixed-effects 
regressions: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑇𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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Where the dependent variable, y, varies by state i and year t, and includes the Gini 
coefficient, the top 1 percent and top 10 percent income share, the poverty rate, and the (log) real 
income of the 10th and 20th percentiles. Our main independent variables of interest are the log 
real minimum wage, logMW, union coverage in the state, Union, and the top marginal tax rate, 
TMTR. We then control for a number of business cycle and growth variables in the vector X 
which includes the state and national unemployment and growth rates, a national recession 
dummy, high school and college graduates (from Frank 2009), and the percent of employment in 
the manufacturing sector. 
The fixed-effect regression results are presented in Table 24. Column (i) shows that a one 
percent increase in the real minimum wage is associated with a 0.039 percentage point fall in the 
Gini coefficient. An increase from the 25th percentile real minimum wage ($6.15) to the 75th 
percentile ($7.15) is an increase of approximately 16 percent. Increasing the minimum wage by 
16 percent would be associated with a modest decrease in the Gini coefficient of about 0.64 
points. Note that union coverage, the top marginal tax rate, and manufacturing employment also 
significantly reduce state-level inequality. 
[Table 2 here] 
Column (ii) suggests that the decrease in inequality is mainly coming from reducing 
incomes at the top. We see that a one percent increase in the real minimum wage is associated 
                                                 
4 Lee (1999) and Autor, Manning, and Smith (2014) warn against fixed effect regressions in this 
type of analysis as it potentially leads to upward bias in the estimated coefficients. Autor, Manning, and 
Smith (2014) use an instrumental variables approach. But the test of their approach (as suggested in Lee 
(1999) is that it “finds no impact of the minimum wage on the upper tail of the wage distribution.” (Autor, 
Manning, and Smith 2014, p.3). But this conflicts with our hypothesis. We, in fact, expect to see an effect 
of the minimum wage on the upper tail of the wage distribution, and so must find a different approach. 
We also use a GMM Arellano-Bond regression as a check on these fixed-effects regressions. 
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with a 0.026 percentage point decrease in the top 1 percent income share. Again, moving from 
the 25th percentile to the 75th would be associated with a significant but modest 0.4 percentage 
point decrease in income share. Of course, moving from the maximum to the minimum, about an 
89 percent increase, would be associated with a more than 2 percentage point drop in income 
share. 
President Obama and the Congressional Democrats currently support an increase in the 
Federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $10.10, a 39 percent increase, as well as indexing it to 
inflation. The results in Table 2 suggest that this could decrease state-level Gini coefficients by 
1.54 points (on a 100 point scale) and decrease the top 1 percent income share by approximately 
1 percentage point. 
Interestingly, columns (iii) and (iv) show no significant relationship between the real 
minimum wage and the top 10 percent income share or the poverty rate. While the coefficient on 
the minimum wage in column (iv) is negative, it is quite small and statistically insignificant. The 
real minimum wage does appear to lift the incomes of those within the bottom 10 percent of the 
income distribution in column (v). But a 1 percent increase in the minimum wage only increases 
income at the 10th percentile by about 0.1 percent so this appears to be a modest effect. This 
suggests that the proposed minimum wage increase could increase the real average income at the 
10th percentile by almost 4 percent. There is no significant effect of the minimum wage on the 
20th percentile income in column (vi). 
Union coverage as a percent of total employment is also significant in reducing 
inequality, both by reducing the top income shares and by reducing poverty. A one percentage 
point increase in union coverage decreases the top 1 percent and top 10 percent income share by 
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0.21 and 0.24 percentage points, respectively. It also reduces the poverty rate by 0.1 percentage 
points. Given that union coverage ranges from 3.3 percent to almost 40 percent in the 30 years of 
this data set, this can have a significant effect on inequality and the poverty rate. 
The top state marginal tax rate is also associated with lower inequality, mainly by 
reducing the share of income going to the top 10 percent. This is in contrast to Malloy (2015) 
which finds the effect of the top federal income tax rate in reducing the top 1 percent income 
share and increasing growth among the bottom 90 percent of households. 
Given that we have 50 states and only a maximum of 31 years, using the GMM method 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and implemented by Roodman (2014) for low T high N 
panels may be appropriate. These regressions are presented in Table 3. The dependent variable is 
lagged for two periods and the national variables (growth, unemployment, and recession) are 
treated as instruments. 
[Table 3 here] 
We find very similar results using this methodology as with the fixed-effects regression. 
The effect of the minimum wage on the Gini coefficient and the top 1 percent income share is 
significant and nearly identical. Here the proposed 39 percent increase in the minimum wage 
would be associated with a 1.6 point decrease in the Gini coefficient and a 0.84 percentage point 
decrease in the top 1 percent income share. 
We get slight significance on the effect of the minimum wage in reducing the top 10 
percent income share, although the statistical and economic significance is slight. In these GMM 
regressions we lose significance on the minimum wage’s effect on the 10th percentile income. 
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Again, we do not see a significant effect of the minimum wage on the poverty rate or the 20th 
percentile average income. 
The effects of union coverage and the top marginal tax rate are similar in sign in the 
Arellano-Bond regressions as in the fixed-effect regressions. While the coefficients on the top 
marginal tax rate remain significant, the coefficient for union coverage only remains significant 
in reducing poverty. 
While the correlation between the minimum wage and the top 1 percent income share 
seems robust from the results in Tables 2 and 3, they do not point to causality. It’s possible that 
our wage bargaining hypothesis is incorrect and that the causality actually runs in the opposite 
direction. This would be more in line with a political economy explanation in which the top 1 
percent’s political power is proportional to its income share and so those at the top of the income 
distribution are more successful in keeping wages at the bottom low when they are more 
powerful5. 
To try to disentangle cause from effect, we create a dummy variable equal to one in the 
year in which there is a real increase to the minimum wage. There is also the question of whether 
we should add a trend variable. In the time frame of our data set there is a clear trend in our main 
variables of interest. The top 1 percent income share is increasing and unionization rates and real 
minimum wages are trending down over the 30 years in the data set. While our job is to try to 
explain these trends, we do feel that including a linear trend variable may help compensate for 
any omitted variables.  
                                                 
5 It’s also possible, of course, that there is some other variable affecting both the minimum wage and the 
top income share that we have not accounted for. 
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Tables 4 and 5 first add the linear trend variable (columns (i), (iii), and (v)) and then add 
the dummy variable for a real minimum wage increase including five lags (columns (ii), (iv), and 
(vi)). That is, these regressions included a dummy variable for whether there was an increase this 
year (t=0), last year (t-1), all the way back to five years ago (t-5). Adding the trend variable does 
not change the results for the minimum wage significantly, although union coverage loses 
significance for all dependent variables except the poverty rate. 
[Table 4 here] 
The lagged dummy variables for a real minimum wage increase may tell an interesting 
story. When these variables are included, what we seem to see is a labor market that adjusts 
somewhat slowly over time. The story on inequality in column (ii) is not consistent across 
specification, although either the value of the minimum wage or the increase is associated with 
less inequality. The regression results on the top 1 percent income share in column (iv) shows 
that the value of the real minimum wage has no significant effect, but that an increase reduces 
the top 1 percent income share significantly over each of the next five years. This result is robust 
to specification and seems to provide more support for a causal interpretation of a higher 
minimum wage reducing the top 1 percent income share over time as labor is able to capture 
more of the surplus. 
[Table 5 here] 
Interestingly, when the real minimum wage increase is included, the value of the 
minimum wage now seems to be successful in reducing poverty (column (vi)), supporting the 
results found in Dube (2013). But what we see is that some of the decrease in poverty is given 
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back over time, perhaps as the labor market adjusts to the higher wages and either hours or 
employment are reduced.  
IV. Conclusion and policy implications 
Workers’ bargaining power increased starting in the 1930s with New Deal legislation, 
including the minimum wage included in the FLSA, and increased in the post-WWII era as 
unionization increased, top marginal tax rates remained high, and U.S. industry had little 
competition from abroad. The minimum wage hit a high in terms of real value in 1968, within 
about five years of what appears to be the turning point for U.S. income inequality. 
But after about 1973, workers have felt their bargaining power erode steadily. Global 
competition began to increase putting high-cost union firms at a disadvantage. The Reagan 
revolution sharply reduced top marginal tax rates providing more incentive for executives and 
shareholders to reduce labor costs. Containerization decreased the costs of producing with less 
expensive offshore labor, further weakening the position of U.S. workers. And the real value of 
the minimum wage was allowed to erode until it is now more than 30 percent below that 1968 
value. 
If the country wishes to reverse the income inequality trends of the last 40 years, the 
policies to do so should be fairly clear. The federal government (and the states) should work to 
rebalance the relative bargaining power between workers and firms so that the surplus created by 
worker-firm matches can be split more equitably. This would include increasing the minimum 
wage, increasing the top marginal tax rates, and making it as easy as possible for workers to 
exercise their right to organize and bargain collectively. These were the post-WWII policies that 
allowed the country to enjoy its lowest levels of income inequality in its history, and there is 
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increasing evidence that they are the policies needed to reduce the soaring levels of inequality 
the country is currently experiencing. 
However, as the relative economic power of labor declined and that of the top 1 percent 
increased, so too did the political power shift. This becomes a vicious cycle in which economic 
resources are translated into political power and policies are put in place that favor the top 1 
percent. This can lead to policies that further erode labor’s bargaining power, keeping top 
marginal tax rates low, eroding the value of the real minimum wage, and making it difficult for 
workers to organize. If this cycle is to stop, the country will have to break the connection 
between money and political influence by once again controlling political contributions (or even 
making all campaigns publicly financed), making it easier or even mandatory to vote by making 
election day a national holiday, and passing a constitutional amendment to break the connection 
between money and free speech. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Potential Locations of the Minimum Wage in Worker-Firm Surplus 
 
Figure 2: The Minimum Wage and Labor Bargaining Power 
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Figure 3: The Minimum Wage vs. Top 1 percent Income Share 
 
Source: Frank (2009), U.S. Department of Labor 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real Minimum Wage 
($2009) 1550 $6.68 $0.76 $5.33 $10.05 
Gini Coefficient 1550 55.66 4.77 44.63 70.88 
Top 1 percent Income Share 1550 13.86 4.29 5.72 28.24 
Top 10 percent Income 
Share 1550 38.28 5.04 28.48 54.63 
Union Coverage 1550 16.70 7.17 3.30 39.90 
Top Marginal Tax Rate 1550 43.23 6.89 28.00 58.33 
Poverty Rate 1500 12.89 3.88 2.90 27.20 
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Regression of Effects of Real Minimum Wage 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
  Gini Top 1 percent Top 10 percent Poverty 
(Log) 10 
percent 
Percentile 
(Log) 20 
percent 
percentile 
 Coefficient Income Share Income Share Rate Real Income Real Income 
              
(Log) Real Minimum Wage -3.917*** -2.566** 0.445 -0.293 0.106** 0.0681 
 (1.354) (1.183) (1.029) (0.748) (0.0497) (0.0410) 
Union Coverage ( percent Employment) -0.170*** -0.210*** -0.243*** -0.106*** 0.00320 0.00478** 
 (0.0533) (0.0574) (0.0607) (0.0336) (0.00244) (0.00201) 
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.150*** -0.0170 -0.0653*** -0.0172 -0.000371 -0.000238 
 (0.0135) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.000667) (0.000553) 
Manufacturing ( percent Employment) -0.396*** -0.196** -0.240*** -0.0630 -0.00265 -0.00488* 
 (0.0911) (0.0754) (0.0826) (0.0524) (0.00363) (0.00283) 
High School Graduates ( percent of Pop) 0.142*** 0.0723 0.0516 -0.115*** -0.00267 -0.00160 
 (0.0496) (0.0516) (0.0592) (0.0417) (0.00199) (0.00165) 
College Graduates ( percent of Pop) 0.0134 0.387*** 0.480*** -0.0779 0.0143*** 0.0132*** 
 (0.0802) (0.0939) (0.0811) (0.0679) (0.00400) (0.00332) 
Real State GDP Growth -0.0676* 0.0446 0.0503 0.0204 -0.00306** -0.00243** 
 (0.0396) (0.0300) (0.0336) (0.0190) (0.00138) (0.00104) 
28 
 
State Unemployment Rate 0.00392 0.0732 -0.0368 0.647*** -0.0182*** -0.0129*** 
 (0.105) (0.0994) (0.0797) (0.0663) (0.00601) (0.00438) 
US Real GDP Growth -0.0659 -0.0878* -0.181*** 0.0356 -0.00247 -0.00219 
 (0.0438) (0.0443) (0.0428) (0.0398) (0.00244) (0.00228) 
US Unemployment Rate -0.239* -0.495*** -0.638*** -0.0135 0.00528 -0.000477 
 (0.130) (0.116) (0.0929) (0.0788) (0.00626) (0.00454) 
US Recession Dummy 0.0255 0.174 -0.346** -0.170 -0.00109 -0.00612 
 (0.156) (0.157) (0.149) (0.198) (0.0169) (0.0134) 
Constant 71.68*** 19.01*** 42.48*** 19.80*** 9.487*** 9.965*** 
 (5.178) (4.197) (4.529) (3.133) (0.194) (0.157) 
Observations 1,549 1,549 1,549 1,499 1,065 1,065 
Number of states 50 50 50 50 41 41 
R2 0.84 0.79 0.90 0.83 0.75 0.83 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table 3: Arellano-Bond GMM Regression of Effects of Real Minimum Wage 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
  Gini Top 1 percent Top 10 percent Poverty 
(Log) 10 
percent 
Percentile 
(Log) 20 
percent 
percentile 
 Coefficient Income Share Income Share Rate Real Income Real Income 
              
(Log) Real Minimum Wage -4.064*** -2.159*** -0.764* -0.825 0.0689 0.0412 
 (0.809) (0.544) (0.401) (0.709) (0.0489) (0.0411) 
Union Coverage ( percent Employment) 0.00863 -0.0277 -0.0310 -0.0988*** 0.00321 0.00441** 
 (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0191) (0.0357) (0.00252) (0.00191) 
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.0512*** 0.00983* -0.0126*** -0.0107 -0.000660 -0.000386 
 (0.00496) (0.00515) (0.00359) (0.00922) (0.000559) (0.000433) 
Manufacturing ( percent Employment) -0.0205 -0.0200 0.0209 -0.0837** -0.000529 -0.000203 
 (0.0247) (0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0334) (0.00238) (0.00203) 
High School Graduates ( percent of Pop) 0.0920** 0.227*** 0.175*** -0.0403 0.0117*** 0.00976*** 
 (0.0419) (0.0313) (0.0312) (0.0616) (0.00394) (0.00304) 
College Graduates ( percent of Pop) -0.166*** -0.0810** -0.0646** 0.00486 -0.00387 -0.00658* 
 (0.0392) (0.0342) (0.0301) (0.0452) (0.00384) (0.00341) 
Real State GDP Growth -0.0181 0.0547*** 0.0350* -0.00785 -0.00211** -0.00151* 
 (0.0191) (0.0180) (0.0183) (0.0175) (0.000989) (0.000810) 
30 
 
State Unemployment Rate -0.0651 0.0418 0.0121 0.549*** -0.0102* -0.00722* 
 (0.0446) (0.0313) (0.0243) (0.0603) (0.00568) (0.00403) 
US Real GDP Growth -0.0354 -0.0497** -0.0735*** -0.0184 0.00162 0.000320 
 (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0462) (0.00296) (0.00271) 
US Unemployment Rate 0.00992 -0.0483 -0.117*** -0.0273 0.00499 -0.000362 
 (0.0376) (0.0312) (0.0329) (0.0777) (0.00608) (0.00437) 
US Recession Dummy -0.799*** -1.034*** -1.220*** -0.0709 0.0289 0.0142 
 (0.121) (0.156) (0.132) (0.205) (0.0216) (0.0170) 
Dependent Variable, First Lag 0.880*** 1.094*** 0.973*** 0.198*** 0.174*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0307) (0.0416) (0.0306) (0.0440) (0.0377) 
Dependent Variable, Second Lag -0.185*** -0.396*** -0.266*** 0.0351 -0.0102 -0.0174 
 (0.0290) (0.0329) (0.0362) (0.0309) (0.0410) (0.0423) 
Observations 1,398 1,398 1,398 1,348 941 941 
Number of states 50 50 50 50 41 41 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Fixed-Effects Regression of Effects of Real Minimum Wage Increases 
       
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient Top 1 percent Income Share Poverty Rate 
              
(Log) Real Minimum Wage -4.159*** -13.20*** -2.997*** 2.417 -0.297 -3.607** 
 
(1.242) (2.961) (1.089) (2.009) (0.739) (1.774) 
Union Coverage ( percent Employment) -0.0479 -0.0576 0.0139 0.0918 -0.113*** -0.0664 
 
(0.0614) (0.115) (0.0340) (0.0610) (0.0366) (0.0500) 
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.156*** -0.112*** -0.0286*** -0.0177 -0.0168 0.0107 
 
(0.0121) (0.0132) (0.00862) (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0135) 
Manufacturing ( percent Employment) -0.326*** -0.406*** -0.0655 -0.0473 -0.0678 -0.0954 
 
(0.0866) (0.0949) (0.0642) (0.0853) (0.0520) (0.0605) 
High School Graduates ( percent of Pop) 0.0360 0.125** -0.122** 0.0411 -0.109** -0.143** 
 
(0.0436) (0.0530) (0.0521) (0.0752) (0.0417) (0.0704) 
College Graduates ( percent of Pop) -0.261*** -0.293*** -0.117 -0.275*** -0.0633 -0.111 
 
(0.0897) (0.0989) (0.0911) (0.101) (0.0832) (0.0839) 
Real State GDP Growth -0.0750** -0.0375 0.0310 0.0771*** 0.0209 0.0222 
 
(0.0341) (0.0317) (0.0255) (0.0247) (0.0189) (0.0199) 
State Unemployment Rate 0.00346 0.0586 0.0722 0.0573 0.647*** 0.720*** 
 
(0.1000) (0.108) (0.0851) (0.0980) (0.0661) (0.0819) 
US Real GDP Growth 0.0326 -0.00411 0.0923*** -0.173*** 0.0311 0.153** 
 
(0.0389) (0.0531) (0.0309) (0.0507) (0.0397) (0.0653) 
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US Unemployment Rate -0.185 -0.256** -0.395*** -0.703*** -0.0150 0.0237 
 
(0.122) (0.127) (0.101) (0.111) (0.0782) (0.103) 
US Recession Dummy -0.212* -0.342** -0.264* -1.594*** -0.150 0.291 
 
(0.126) (0.145) (0.139) (0.112) (0.202) (0.203) 
Linear Trend 0.244*** 0.162* 0.448*** 0.470*** -0.0134 0.00880 
 
(0.0560) (0.0826) (0.0401) (0.0406) (0.0305) (0.0375) 
Minimum Wage Increase (Dummy) 
 
1.238*** 
 
-0.522* 
 
0.644*** 
  
(0.255) 
 
(0.271) 
 
(0.177) 
MW Increase (t-1) 
 
0.999*** 
 
-0.470** 
 
0.325* 
  
(0.194) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.175) 
MW Increase (t-2) 
 
0.771*** 
 
-0.487** 
 
0.293** 
  
(0.188) 
 
(0.198) 
 
(0.140) 
MW Increase (t-3) 
 
0.314** 
 
-1.000*** 
 
0.102 
  
(0.148) 
 
(0.176) 
 
(0.152) 
MW Increase (t-4) 
 
-0.374** 
 
-1.111*** 
 
0.268** 
  
(0.146) 
 
(0.161) 
 
(0.106) 
MW Increase (t-5) 
 
-0.0225 
 
-1.572*** 
 
0.0892 
  
(0.143) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.134) 
Constant 74.49*** 87.14*** 24.13*** 9.260 19.70*** 25.04*** 
 
(4.789) (8.448) (5.089) (7.382) (3.142) (5.601) 
Observations 1,549 1,249 1,549 1,249 1,499 1,249 
Number of states 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.86 0.81 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.84 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
Table 5: Arellano-Bond GMM Regression of Effects of Real Minimum Wage Increases 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient Top 1 percent Income Share Poverty Rate 
              
(Log) Real Minimum Wage -4.186*** -1.855 -2.451*** 1.123 -0.890 -5.158*** 
 
(0.810) (1.221) (0.529) (0.806) (0.710) (1.637) 
Union Coverage ( percent Employment) 0.0186 0.0329 0.0125 0.0231 -0.118*** -0.0637 
 
(0.0242) (0.0235) (0.0201) (0.0256) (0.0385) (0.0446) 
Top Marginal Tax Rate -0.0532*** -0.0686*** 0.00318 -0.0147*** -0.00982 0.0114 
 
(0.00514) (0.00605) (0.00510) (0.00516) (0.00931) (0.0114) 
Manufacturing ( percent Employment) -0.0341 0.0718* -0.0759*** 0.0248 -0.0691** -0.159*** 
 
(0.0275) (0.0374) (0.0175) (0.0268) (0.0346) (0.0598) 
High School Graduates ( percent of Pop) 0.0224 -0.0313 0.0524 -0.0227 -0.0173 0.0201 
 
(0.0447) (0.0508) (0.0335) (0.0430) (0.0665) (0.0644) 
College Graduates ( percent of Pop) -0.151*** -0.0797* -0.0410 -0.00618 -0.00194 -0.0741 
 
(0.0383) (0.0429) (0.0360) (0.0368) (0.0471) (0.0548) 
Real State GDP Growth -0.0221 0.000662 0.0423** 0.0672*** -0.00631 -0.000953 
 
(0.0179) (0.0142) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0160) 
State Unemployment Rate -0.0641 0.0388 0.0436 0.0566 0.546*** 0.593*** 
 
(0.0461) (0.0418) (0.0311) (0.0421) (0.0613) (0.0770) 
34 
 
US Real GDP Growth -0.0309 0.0308 -0.0387** 0.183*** -0.0186 0.138** 
 
(0.0218) (0.0267) (0.0193) (0.0343) (0.0462) (0.0645) 
US Unemployment Rate 0.00589 -0.0631* -0.0905** -0.0346 -0.0154 0.0637 
 
(0.0385) (0.0351) (0.0353) (0.0515) (0.0775) (0.0980) 
US Recession Dummy -0.859*** -0.878*** -1.135*** -1.332*** 0.00222 0.434* 
 
(0.119) (0.133) (0.148) (0.137) (0.202) (0.235) 
Linear Trend 0.0467* 0.0471 0.150*** 0.170*** -0.0244 -0.00413 
 
(0.0280) (0.0316) (0.0154) (0.0143) (0.0239) (0.0289) 
Minimum Wage Increase (Dummy) 
 
-0.503*** 
 
-0.281** 
 
0.687*** 
  
(0.169) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.171) 
MW Increase (t-1) 
 
0.161 
 
-0.311*** 
 
0.412** 
  
(0.148) 
 
(0.0738) 
 
(0.171) 
MW Increase (t-2) 
 
-0.410*** 
 
-0.408*** 
 
0.322** 
  
(0.117) 
 
(0.0975) 
 
(0.137) 
MW Increase (t-3) 
 
-0.294*** 
 
-0.696*** 
 
0.136 
  
(0.113) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.150) 
MW Increase (t-4) 
 
-0.642*** 
 
-0.414*** 
 
0.294*** 
  
(0.104) 
 
(0.0753) 
 
(0.102) 
MW Increase (t-5) 
 
0.123* 
 
-0.494*** 
 
0.110 
  
(0.0743) 
 
(0.0917) 
 
(0.125) 
Dependent Variable, First Lag 0.871*** 0.835*** 1.044*** 0.891*** 0.202*** 0.187*** 
35 
 
 
(0.0417) (0.0623) (0.0335) (0.0369) (0.0305) (0.0315) 
Dependent Variable, Second Lag -0.194*** -0.106 -0.434*** -0.227*** 0.0331 0.0428 
 
(0.0274) (0.0664) (0.0299) (0.0313) (0.0311) (0.0290) 
       
Observations 1,398 1,198 1,398 1,198 1,348 1,198 
Number of states 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
 
